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In response to recent debates on the need to abandon the Dead Donor 
Rule (DDR) to facilitate vital-organ transplantation, I claim that, 
through a detailed philosophical analysis of the Uniform 
Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the DDR, some acts that 
seem to violate DDR in fact do not, thus DDR can be upheld. The 
paper consists of two parts. First, standard apparatuses of the 
philosophy of language, such as sense, referent, truth condition, and 
definite description are employed to show that there exists an 
internally consistent and coherent interpretation of UDDA which 
resolves the Reduction Problem and the Ambiguity Problem that 
allegedly threaten the UDDA framework, and as a corollary, the 
practice of Donation after the Circulatory Determination of Death 
(DCDD) does not violate DDR. Second, an interpretation of the DDR, 
termed ‘No Hastening Death Rule’ (NHDR), is formulated so that, 
given that autonomy and non-maleficence principles are observed, 
the waiting time for organ procurement can be further shortened 
without DDR being violated.  
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In the practices of vital-organ transplantation, while doctors typically want 
to procure a vital-organ as early as possible, the Dead Donor Rule (DDR) 
requires them to wait till the donor is dead, for otherwise the procurement 
would constitute, presumably, an act of killing. For some authors (cf. 
Veatch 2008), this amounts to the impossibility of a lawful vital-organ 
transplantation. Commenting on this situation, Robert Truog maintains that 
current practices in organ procurement do cause the death of the person if 
death is understood in the ‘scientific way’,1  and claims that while the long-
term solution to this problem should be to reframe the ethics of vital-organ 
donation in terms of the principle of respect for autonomy and the principle 
of non-maleficence rather than the DDR, the short term solution is to 
“conceptualize current approaches to defining death as socially acceptable 
‘legal fictions’” 2  (Truog 2015, 1885). Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and 
Franklin Miller (2013), on the other hand, offer a more radical solution by 
showing that there is nothing wrong with killing per se, hence DDR can be 
safely dropped. 
 
The present paper proposes an alternative way out. By resorting to standard 
apparatuses in the philosophy of language and putting DDR and other 
relevant regulations or practices, such as UDDA and DCDD, under 
scrutiny,3 I show that there is an interpretation of UDDA that captures a 
certain aspect of our intuition about the death of a person,4  and, with 
respect to which, current practices of DCDD do not violate DDR. Hence 
there is neither a short-term need to regard UDDA as merely creating legal 
fictions nor a long-term need to abandon DDR. More specifically, I discuss 
two conceptual problems which, with DDR upheld, seem to threaten the 
present definition of UDDA and current practices of organ 
transplantation,5 and resolve them in philosophical terms. Then I go one 
step further to formulate NHDR (No Hastening Death Rule), a version of 
DDR, which I claim to capture the spirit of donor protection better than the 
DDR taken at face value, and with NHDR, the waiting time for an organ 
procurement can be further shortened. 
                                                 
1 The scientific standard mentioned in Truog (2015), attributed to Bernat, defines death as 
“the permanent cessation of functioning of the organism as a whole” (Truog 2015, 1892). 
2 By regarding a current definition of death as merely a ‘legal fiction’, one is reluctant to 
accept that the definition has captured the true notion of death.  
3 These are the abbreviations for the ‘Uniform Determination of Death Act’, and ‘Donation 
after the Circulatory Determination of Death’ respectively. 
4  Shewmon (2004; 2010) nicely demonstrates the intrinsic difficulties in obtaining a 
uniform definition of death. 
5 See Veatch (2008; 2010) for example. Note that many authors have proposed that DDR 
should be revised or dropped, see, for instance, Miller, Truog, and Brock (2010) and 
Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller (2013). 
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1. Upholding DDR in the Face of UDDA 
 
By the Dead Donor Rule (DDR), I mean the following: 
 
DDR A vital organ H of a person A can be procured for 
donation at time t only if A is already dead at t. 
 
Here, I should clarify what I mean by a ‘vital organ’ first. A ‘vital organ’ 
can mean a type of organs the removal of which would generally lead to 
the death of the owner. Heart, for example, is a vital organ in this sense, 
while appendix is not. However, a ‘vital organ’ can also denote a specific 
organ of a person the removal of which would lead to the person’s death. 
Although heart is a vital organ in the first sense, a specific heart might not 
be vital in the second sense if its owner will be blown to pieces by a bomb 
a split second later or if its owner is currently receiving a new heart through 
a heart transplantation—after all, the removal of the (old) heart would not 
in any way hasten his death. To avoid further confusion, I shall refer to a 
vital organ in the first sense by a ‘vital-organ’, and reserve the term ‘vital 
organ’ for a vital organ in the second sense, and throughout Section 1, we 
shall only understand the ‘vital organ’ in DDR in the first sense, namely, 
as “vital-organ”. In other words, in Section 1, we are concerned with 
 
[DDR1] A vital-organ H of a person A can be procured for 
donation at time t only if A is already dead at t. 
 
In general, interpreting DDR in the first sense would yield us a rule which 
is more strict, because, according to it, insofar as an organ is a vital-organ, 
it can only be procured after the owner is dead, even if the organ is actually 
not vital for that person.6 In this section, issues about the UDDA-DDR 
framework and the practices of vital-organ procurement in the US will be 
formulated as two conceptual problems, which will then be settled by 
linguistic and philosophical means. 
 
1.1 The Reduction Problem—How can Death Amount to Brain 
Death? 
 
In Truog (2007), it says that in 2005, Dr. Sanjay Gupta, a neurosurgeon 
and Senior Medical Correspondence for CNN, told Larry King, “Well, you 
know, a dead person really means that the heart is no longer beating […] 
people do draw a distinction between brain dead and dead” (Truog 2007, 
                                                 
6 Certainly, in rare cases, a non-vital-organ can happen to be vital for a particular person as 
well, whose procurement will be blocked by the DDR in the second sense but allowed by 
the DDR in the first sense. But, for simplicity, we shall ignore such cases in this paper. 
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274), which amounts to publicly disagreeing with current medical and 
legal criteria of death. Indeed, some authors, such as D. Alan Shewmon 
and Robert D. Truog, have tried and succeeded in convincing key figures 
in medical ethics, including some members of the President’s Council on 
Bioethics,7 to the extent that the Council admits that “[…] it would be 
difficult to deny that the body of a patient with total brain failure can still 
be alive, at least in some cases” (Miller and Truog 2011, 72). 
 
In this subsection, we discuss whether it is justifiable to define the death 
of a person in terms of the ‘death’ of one of his or her organs. Now, the 
death statement ‘John is dead’ clearly cannot be defined by ‘The brain of 
John is dead’. The subject of the former sentence, namely ‘John’, is a 
proper name referring to a person, while that of the latter, namely ‘the brain 
of John’, is a definite description denoting an organ, yet they share the 
common predicate ‘dead’. Apparently, we cannot define the death of 
something in terms of the death of some other thing if we do not know the 
extension of ‘death’ in the first place. 
 
A natural solution to the above problem is to stress that the phrase ‘brain-
death’ itself by no means suggests that the death of a person is 
characterized by the ‘death’ of his brain; it only suggests that the death of 
a person is to be determined by some condition of his brain. For example, 
using ‘b-death’ instead of ‘death’ for the brain condition in question is a 
way out. To avoid future confusion, let me introduce new symbols to stand 
for some predicates that concern us in this paper. 
 
 ‘John is D’ stands for ‘John is dead’. 
 ‘John is Db’ stands for ‘John is brain-dead’. 
 ‘The brain is bD’ stands for ‘the brain is b-dead’. 
 
The brain-dead definition of death can then be summarized as follow: 
 
John is D if John is Db, and John is Db if the brain of John is 
bD. (*) 
 
While the subject of a sentence of the form ‘John is D’ is still a proper 
name that refers to a person, and the criterion for the person’s death is still 
expressed in terms of a sentence whose subject is a definite description, 
namely ‘the brain of John’, which denotes the brain of the person, the latter 
sentence is no longer a statement about the death of a “person”, and the 
predicate is bD instead of D or Db. 
 
                                                 
7 See President’s Council on Bioethics: Controversies in the Determination of Death 2008. 
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Note that regardless of what the content of bD truly is, the presence of a 
definite description in (*) alone generates a semantic issue concerning 
personal death. As ‘John is D’ is about John, while ‘the brain of John is 
bD’ is about John’s brain, it is unlikely that the two sentences can be 
synonymous.8 Intuitively, if John loses his entire brain, then we would say 
that John is dead. Nevertheless, the bD statement about John’s brain now 
becomes either truth-valueless (analogous to the claim that ‘the King of 
France is bald’ makes no statement when there is simply no King of France 
at present) or false (if Russell’s theory of definite description is to be 
adopted).9 So, the practice of defining the death of a person in terms of 
certain property of some part of the person’s body seems problematic. 
Following the spirit of a Strawson/Wolfram framework10 which regards 
‘the King of France is bald’ as making no statement, one can claim that if 
John has lost his brain then a sentence token ‘John is D’ is truth-valueless. 
On the other hand, according to the Russellian framework, if John has no 
brain then he cannot be D, which is even more absurd. Imagine trying to 
complete a sentence that begins with “Pew is blind if and only if the eyes 
of Pew are …”, while soon reckoning that it is possible that Blind Pew 
simply has no eyes. 
 
Elbourne claims that for certain sentences in which definite descriptions 
are embedded under propositional attitude verbs and conditionals, the 
Fregean analysis of definite descriptions is superior to the Russellian 
analysis. For example, “Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet 
tonight” (Elbourne 2010, 8) does not entail that Hans wants that there exists 
exactly one ghost in his attic11 (the Russellian way). Rather, it presupposes 
the existence of exactly one ghost in his attic (the Fregean way). Similarly, 
“If the ghost in his attic is quiet tonight, Hans will hold a party” is not to 
be rephrased as “If there is exactly one ghost in his attic and it is quiet 
tonight, Hans will hold a party” (Elbourne 2010, 2). Again, it presupposes 
the existence of exactly one ghost in his attic. 
 
This framework helps us to better analyze the problem that I raised two 
paragraphs back. Analogous to Elbourne’s analysis,12 the sentence ‘John is 
D if and only if the brain of John is bD’ is not to be translated as ‘John is 
                                                 
8 In the sense that the truth condition of one is governed by the other. 
9 According to Russell’s theory, for the b-death statement to be true, John has to have a 
brain to start with. More specifically, the F is Q if and only if (i) there is an x such that Fx, 
(ii) for all y, if Fy then x=y, and (iii) Qx. 
10 See Wolfram (1989). 
11 For simplicity, here I assume that ‘Hans wants A and B’ implies ‘Hans wants A’. 
12 Note that Elbourne’s analysis is primarily for embedded statements, but we find an 
analogous phenomenon here. 
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D if and only if there is exactly one brain of John and it is bD’. John’s 
having a brain is no longer a necessary condition for his death. Rather, (*) 
only presupposes the existence of a brain of John and when John has lost 
his brain, (*) is no longer applicable. What can we say about John’s death 
if at the instance of his death he does not have a brain?13 
 
Recall that the Fregean account of sense and reference tells us that the 
sense of ‘John’ in ‘John walks’ determines the referent [John]w of ‘John’ 
when the sentence is tokened in world w, and the token is true provided 
that [John]w lies in [walks]w, the set of all things that walk. Would such a 
mechanism work for a death statement of the form ‘John is dead’ as well? 
At the most abstract level, it would still work, but in practice it does not. If 
John is blown into pieces by a bomb, then there simply is no entity left in 
the world that can be said to be the ‘referent’ of ‘John’, but we can still 
claim that he is dead. Presumably, outlining the truth condition of a death 
statement without assuming that ‘John’ refers is a better approach. 
According to this approach, we only need to resort to something denoted 
by the definite description ‘the brain of John’ and see if it lies in the 
extension of the predicate bD. More specifically, the no-brain (or no-body) 
problem mentioned earlier can be resolved by 1) taking the definite 
description ‘the brain of John’ as presupposing the existence of a unique 
referent rather than asserting its existence, and 2) in case John has lost his 
brain (or his entire body), we simply stipulate that he is dead because his 
brain no longer exists—in other words, ‘the brain of John is bD’ vacuously 
holds. So, in contrast to the Russellian account, the brain of John is bD if 
and only if John has exactly one brain and the brain meets the criteria 
associated with bD or John no longer has a brain. Specifically, when John 
has lost his brain, the sentence ‘John is D’ is false, truth-valueless, and true 
according to the Russellian account, the Fregean account, and the present 
account, respectively. 
 
In sum, despite that the subject of ‘John is dead’ is a proper name for a 
person, the truth condition of the statement can be described by another 
sentence whose subject is a definite description denoting one specific 
organ of John. Here the definite description itself is to be interpreted more 
in the Fregean than in the Russellian way. However, when the definite 
description fails to denote, the death statement will still have a definite 




                                                 
13 Strictly speaking, when John has gotten two brains, (*) is inapplicable also. 
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1.2 The Ambiguity Problem—Do We Have Two Distinct Notions of 
Death? 
 
In 1981, The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) was approved 
as a model state law for the United States. It states that an individual who 
has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory 
functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem, is dead. Furthermore, a determination of death 
must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards. 
 
A general concern now arises. 
 
(i) The death + death = life Problem 
 
If UDDA is understood as a definition, which defines D as the disjunction 
of Dh and Db, where Dh is a short-hand for the state of a person who meets 
(1), while Db is a short-hand for the state of a person who meets (2), then 
we immediately encounter the alleged death + death = life problem. To be 
more precise. Let A be one that is Dh already but not yet Db, and B be one 
that is Db already but not yet Dh. According to UDDA, they are both dead, 
but given that the transplantation option is available, can we not make use 
of A’s brain and B’s heart-lung system and build a living being from two 
dead persons? 
 
This is not as problematic as it sounds. Imagine that a certain creature, 
Two-Eye say, is composed of a left eye and a right eye. A Two-Eye is 
impaired if at least one of its eyes is broken. Then if recombination is 
possible, we can surely expect to get a non-impaired Two-Eye from a pair 
of impaired Two-Eyes. After all, the problem is with personal identity 
rather than with life-and-death. 
 
If neither the brain nor the heart-lung system is essential14—that is, they 
are replaceable—then the resulting living individual should neither be A 
nor be B, as they are both dead already, and dead people are not expected 
to come back to life. But as the Two-Eye case demonstrates, there is 
nothing odd here at all. 
 
If the brain is the essential part of a person, however, then the resulting 
living individual should of course be A. But, isn’t A already dead by 
UDDA? How come he/she comes back to life after the transplantations? 
Shouldn’t this prove that UDDA is problematic? Not really! The point is 
that if clause (1) is to be considered as a sufficient condition for death, and 
                                                 
14 Here by ‘essential’, I mean essential of for personal identity, not essential for life.  
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it involves irreversibility in its terms, then to announce the death of A 
before the transplantation, we should have thought of the possibility of 
transplantation. Given that after the transplantation, A is apparently alive, 
we should realize that the prior announcement of the death had been 
premature—A’s circulatory and respiratory functions were not yet 
“irreversibly-ceased” in the first place. So, there is no death + death = life 
problem for us to worry about here. 
 
Alternatively, we can regard UDDA as merely listing two criteria of death, 
which together characterize death, rather than regarding each of clause (1) 
and clause (2) as semantically capturing the essence of death. For example, 
if we follow the idea that what is essential for a person is his/her brain, and 
what is essential for a person’s life is his/her brain function, then UDDA 
amounts to characterizing the brain condition of a person through two 
criteria which are pragmatically, rather than semantically, related to the 
underlying condition of the brain. 
 
For brevity and clarity, I will introduce the following abbreviations. If 
clause (1) of UDDA is met, I shall say that the person’s brain is bD1, and if 
clause (2) of UDDA is met, I shall say that the person’s brain is bD2. UDDA 
recognizes the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, i.e. 
bD2, as a criterion for death, which allows doctors to procure vital-organs 
from Db (brain-dead) victims without violating the Dead Donor Rule. 
However, with the acceptance of UDDA, Donation after the Circulatory 
Determination of Death (DCDD) can be a protocol for vital-organ donation 
as well: the life support equipment for severely brain damaged patients are 
removed until the patients meet the traditional circulatory and respiratory 
criteria for death and then the organs are removed. 
 
Now, the listing of these two distinct criteria for death in UDDA makes the 
concept of death sound ambiguous and compromising. In particular, on the 
face of it, one can be dead without her brain being bD2—meeting the 
criterion of bD1 suffices—which seemingly contradicts the guiding 
principle that D (death) is characterized by Db (brain-death), which in turn 
is the main driving force of UDDA’s coming to being. 
 
More specifically, we can imagine that15 (a) while John’s brain is still 
functioning, some foreign creature rips his heart and lung out from his 
chest in an instant, and, Dr. Who, who is obsessed with brain research, 
happily takes this chance and pronounces John dead based on the fact that 
John’s circulatory and respiratory functions have irreversibly ceased, and 
immediately procures John’s brain for research. Intuitively we would 
                                                 
15 See Lizza (2011) for a treatment of this problem through the example of decapitation. 
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expect that as John’s brain can still work for a split second after his heart 
and lung are ripped away, he is not dead yet and Dr. Who is doing harm to 
a living person rather than merely manipulating the corpus of a dead man. 
Analogously, we can imagine that (b) John’s brain has met the bD2 dead 
criterion but his heart is still beating strongly for unknown reasons. Some 
people may find it difficult, as Dr. Gupta did, to suppress the intuition that 
John is not dead yet,16  despite that John has met the criteria of death 
prescribed by UDDA. 
 
A natural reaction to the above objections would be to reformulate UDDA. 
However, UDDA is the outcome of the collective wisdom of many 
individuals, and has been in use for several decades. So, despite that there 
are issues that need to be dealt with more carefully—especially the 
conceptual ones like the ambiguity problem I have just mentioned—
insofar as these issues can be adequately explained in 
linguistic/philosophical terms, our priority should be in keeping it rather 
than altering it. Now, as we have seen in the previous subsection, while a 
death statement concerns a person, its truth condition only resorts to some 
particular organ of the person. So, there can be no ambiguity problem in 
UDDA at all. Clause (1) and clause (2) collectively characterize the 
condition of death for an individual—in our terms, John is D iff John’s 
brain is bD, and John’s brain is bD iff John’s brain is either bD1 or bD2—
and so long as one of the clauses holds, the person is dead. In other words, 
‘John is still alive’ amounts to the conjunction of two clauses. 
 
With the help of these two notions of bD1 and bD2, we can observe that, our 
daily uses of the term ‘brain-death’ can actually mean two different things. 
It can mean either that John’s brain is bD or that John’s brain is bD2. 
However, please bear in mind that in this paper the term ‘brain-death’ is 
reserved for the first reading only. 
 
Now, recall that scenario (a) seems more disturbing than scenario (b). So 
far as scenario (b) is concerned, nowadays many surgeons have been 
practicing the procurement of a beating heart from a person whose brain 
meets the bD2 criterion, without feeling that the donor is still alive. It 
appears that the concept of the death of a person can be a constructed idea 
that we can gradually adapt to. Can one’s uneasiness towards scenario (a) 
be similarly resolved in the future? The answer is probably ‘no’. 
 
                                                 
16 Shewmon, Truog, and a minority of the President’s Council would be reluctant to accept 
that John is already dead as well. See for example, Brugger (2013). 
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In defining death, many authors have attempted to resort to higher brain 
death,17 or the so called ‘cerebral death’, instead of the whole brain death. 
It reflects the fact that John Locke’s psychological continuity account of 
personal identity is not something that easily fades. On the one hand, 
higher brain death proponents maintain that the whole brain death, or the 
bD2 criterion, is not necessary for the death of a person. On the other hand, 
they may suspect that the irreversible cessation of circulatory and 
respiratory functions, or the bD1 criterion, is not sufficient for the death of 
a person, as the higher brain may still be functional. The latter is precisely 
the concern that my scenario (a) tries to raise: is it possible that a person 
who is still conscious, hence alive, be mistakenly pronounced dead 
according to clause (1) of UDDA? 
 
A brain’s being bD is the disjunction of its being bD1 and its being bD2, thus 
the application condition of bD2 is, in practice, more strict than that for 
bD—otherwise we would not need the other criterion, namely, bD1, in the 
first place. So, a brain can indeed be bD without being bD2, as the higher 
brain death proponents would have maintained. However, given that we 
only have two criteria of death, can the other criterion, namely bD1, truly 
capture the higher brain death so that the person in scenario (a) would not 
be mistakenly pronounced dead? 
 
Note that the bD1 criterion, like the bD2 criterion, serves as an indication 
that the brain of the person is bD.18 However, the bD2 criterion normally 
takes longer to meet than the criterion for the bD1 criterion. In practice, the 
bD2 test is usually done when the heart-lung system is still working (with 
the help of an artificial life support system, if needed) so it involves a long 
period of waiting time before checking for brain activities for a second 
time, while the bD1 test is usually done when the heart-lung failure is 
imminent and it involves a waiting time of only several minutes. The 
hidden consensus here is that if the circulatory and respiratory functions 
have ceased for that amount of time, the brain would have been in the state 
of bD even though we have not gone through the usual bD2 test procedure 
for it.19 
 
In sum, the cessation of circulatory-respiratory functions can indeed be 
seen as a sign that indicates that the brain of the individual in question is 
bD already. While we may not have the means to directly assess the 
condition of the brain, we may still pronounce the patient dead according 
                                                 
17 See DeGrazia (2005) and McMahan (2002). 
18 In Bernat’s words, “the circulatory criterion is valid only because it leads to the brain 
criterion” (Bernat 2013, 28). 
19 I do not claim that this notion of brain-death and the ‘higher-brain-death’ amount to the 
same thing. But it is certainly plausible. 
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to the bD1 criterion, because without the help of an artificial life support, 
the cessation of the circulatory-respiratory function is a sure sign that the 
‘key’ brain functions would cease in several minutes if nothing is to be 
done about it. So, the list of two criteria of death in UDDA itself does not 
make the notion of death ambiguous. A truth condition may come with two 
criteria, and insofar as the criteria collectively shape the right concept, the 
listing of two criteria causes no harm. 
 
Now, back to scenario (a). Taking the above into account, what can we say 
about it? In (a), the heart and lung of John are ripped away in an instant, 
so, on the face of it, his circulatory and respiratory functions have 
irreversibly ceased, thus he has met the first clause of UDDA and can be 
pronounced dead, which seems to contradict our intuition that he is not 
dead yet. However, remember that in this particular scenario, we have not 
gone through the waiting time of several minutes as required by accepted 
medical standards. So, we cannot say that the bD1 has been met or that the 
brain is already bD. As the story has already suggested, John might still 
have a split second of consciousness left after his heart and lung were 
ripped away, thus the instant ripping away of John’s heart/lung does not 
entail his death right away—the usual several minutes of waiting is still 
needed for us to pronounce that the brain of John is bD1. 
 
This indeed safeguards human life. Recall that all the issues concerning 
DDR, UDDA and DCDD etc. arise because of the possibility of vital-organ 
transplantation. Now, even though John’s original heart-lung system has 
been ripped away, there is still the possibility that, with the most advanced 
medical technology, a new heart-lung system can be transplanted into 
John’s chest and begin to function in less than a minute’s time, just before 
John’s brain is forever damaged. In other words, ‘the circulatory and 
respiratory functions of the heart-lung system of John’ cannot be said to 
be irreversibly lost at the time of ripping, because that definite description 
‘the heart-lung system’ denotes a system of John that is in his chest (or 
somewhere nearby), regardless of whether it is the original one or a 
replacement. When we say that the president of America has always been 
male, we by no means mean that Joe Biden has always been a male. Rather, 
we mean that each president of America has been male to date. 
Analogously, to say that the heart-lung system of John has irreversibly 
ceased functioning, we should ensure that no possible replacement heart-
lung system, such as an artificial heart-lung system, or a new heart-lung 
system with a transplanted heart, can succeed as ‘the heart-lung system of 
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John’20 and function properly, and this necessitates the waiting of several 
minutes before the pronouncement of death. So scenario (a) amounts to a 
premature judgement of death. John was not dead yet immediately after 
the ripping away of his heart-lung system—his brain was neither bD2 nor 
bD1 yet, even though his original biological heart-lung system had indeed 
irreversibly ceased to function. 
 
Another alleged problem related to the ambiguity problem is the following. 
 
(ii) The Reversing the Irreversible Problem 
 
While the Denver case of successful heart transplantation was hailed as a 
great medical achievement, Veatch draws our attention to the fact that the 
procurement of hearts from DCDD patients for organ donation seems to 
involve reversing the irreversible (Veatch 2008). Imagine that a critically 
ill patient John has chosen to forgo life-sustaining treatment and donate his 
heart. After the withdrawal of life-sustaining equipment, his heart stops 
and after several minutes of waiting, he is pronounced dead because his 
circulatory and respiratory functions are regarded as irreversibly lost, and 
his heart is procured and transplanted into the chest of another patient, 
Smith say, who was on ECMO and has been waiting for a new heart for 
some time. Smith lives well after the transplant, which implies that the new 
heart is beating well in his body. Now, according to Veatch’s insight, a 
moment ago it was declared that the circulatory and respiratory functions 
of John’s heart-lung system were irreversibly lost, and now the heart is 
beating again in another person’s body, does this act of transplantation not 
amount to reversing the irreversible? 
 
Veatch’s point sounds convincing, and according to this view, the Denver 
doctors were guilty of procuring vital organs before the donor was dead, 
thus had violated the homicide law by killing the donor for his or her heart. 
But, as this act saved the lives of the organ recipients, we may choose to 
just muddle through. Or, alternatively, we can see the death of the donor 
as just a legal fiction: the donor is not really dead yet, but based on UDDA 
and current medical criteria for bD1, the donor is ‘dead’ already, even if the 
donor’s heart actually beats nicely in another person’s chest later. Possible 
solutions to Veatch’s challenge, other than muddling through or regarding 
UDDA as creating legal fictions, include 1) deleting the first criterion of 
UDDA or disallowing the procurement of hearts from patients who 
seemingly have (but in fact have not) met the DCDD criterion hereafter, 
                                                 
20 Note that here the de dicto, or small scope, reading of the definite description is the 
intended interpretation, otherwise vital organ transplantation would not be possible in the 
first place. 
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because these patients are not dead yet, and procuring their vital-organs 
violates the DDR; 2) not altering UDDA but simply dropping the DDR, 
thus allowing the procurement of vital-organs from patients who 
seemingly have (but in fact have not) met the DCDD criterion; 3) replacing 
the ‘irreversibility’ requirement of UDDA by ‘permanence’ so that, insofar 
as the procurement is performed, the person’s circulatory and respiratory 
functions have ceased permanently, hence he is dead regardless of whether 
the organ is reversible. 
 
We will not consider options 1) and 2) as they involve either dropping 
UDDA or abandoning DDR, and the goal of the paper is to show that they 
can be held without inconsistency. We will not accept 3) either, because it 
literally alters UDDA—namely, by replacing ‘irreversible’ by 
‘permanent’. Nevertheless, in Section 2, I will return to 3) and see it as a 
failed attempt to shortening the waiting time for a death pronouncement. 
In the meantime, I would only stress that with the help of a careful 
linguistic analysis of the predication of ‘irreversible’, we can show that 
there is no ‘reversing the irreversible’ involved in DCDD donation in the 
first place. 
 
The following example prepares us for this point. Imagine that an alien 
creature needs two functional hearts, an L-heart and an R-heart, for it to be 
alive. So both hearts are vital for such creatures. Now, the function of an 
L-heart will be irreversibly lost after it stops beating for 4 minutes and the 
function of an R-heart will be irreversibly lost after it stops beating for 2 
minutes. Furthermore, an R-heart will stop beating after its corresponding 
L-heart has stopped beating for 2 minutes, and similarly, an L-heart will 
stop beating after its corresponding R-heart has stopped beating for 2 
minutes. So a creature can be pronounced dead after its L-heart has stopped 
beating for 4 minutes or after its R-heart has stopped beating for 2 minutes. 
Moreover, while an L-heart is transplantable, an R-heart is not. Now, 
suppose Alice is such a creature, and the function of her L-heart has 
stopped beating for 4 minutes. Can we transplant Alice’s L-heart into 
Betty’s body without violating the DDR? Yes, because Alice is already 
dead by the criteria set for these creatures, yet the transplanted L-heart still 
has a chance of beating again inside Betty’s body. If the transplantation is 
successful, and Alice’s original L-heart is now beating again in Betty’s 
body, are we not reversing the irreversible? Surely not. What is irreversibly 
lost is the function of the L-heart in Alice’s body—the stopping of the L-
heart for 4 minutes has implied that the corresponding R-heart has stopped 
for 2 minutes, which in turn implies that its corresponding L-heart, in 
Alice’s body, will not be functioning again. It says nothing about the 
function of the L-heart in Betty’s body. 
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The fact that the L-heart of Alice is irreversible at the time of procurement 
and the fact that the L-heart of Betty is beating afterward 21  do not 
contradict each other, even though the former is spatial-temporally 
continuous with the latter (they are virtually the same heart). In conclusion, 
there is no ‘reversing the irreversible’ problem at all. 
 
Now, back to our case concerning DCDD. The irreversibility of John’s 
circulatory and respiratory functions is, after all, a property of John rather 
than of a particular heart/lung system, while the beating again of the 
donated heart is merely a property of the heart, and these facts do not 
contradict each other. John’s failing to have his circulatory-respiratory 
functions re-established on site reveals the fact that he is brain-dead in the 
sense that his brain is b-dead, but that does not imply that his former heart-
lung system cannot be functional in another person’s body. 
 
To sum up this section, the criteria of death listed in UDDA help 
materialize the truth condition of a death statement, by drawing our 
attention to the conditions of some suitable organ of an individual. When 
it comes to the pinning down of the semantics of a death statement, all we 
need is a way of finding out whether some portion of a body can be 
considered as the brain of the individual, and whether the circulatory and 
respiratory functions of a heart-lung system or all functions of the entire 
brain are irreversibly lost. Finally, brain-death says more about the non-




2. Reinterpreting the Dead Donor Rule—The No Hastening Death 
Rule 
 
In this section, we explore the possibility of understanding the ‘vital organ’ 
in DDR in the second sense, and show that with this interpretation, the 
waiting time for procurement can be further shortened without the rule 
being violated. In particular, we shall adopt Shewmon’s insight concerning 
the interpretation of DDR, develop it into a more workable version, and 
show that certain seemingly hasty procurements of vital-organs are not 




                                                 
21 Note that (the function of) Betty’s L-heart cannot be said to be irreversible before the 
transplantation. The L-heart may be not functioning before the transplantation, but with the 
transplantation option, it is not irreversible yet. 
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2.1 Causing Death as Hastening Death 
 
In the Conclusion section of Shewmon (2004), we find: 
  
Regarding organ transplantation, the important and truly 
meaningful question is not ‘When is the patient dead?’ but 
rather ‘When can organs X, Y, Z … be removed without 
causing or hastening death or harming the patient in anyway?’ 
(Shewmon 2004, 297, Emphasis added) 
 
More explicitly, in Shewmon, and Shewmon (2004, 110), we see: 
 
[…] This approach to heart/lung retrieval does not cause or 
hasten death, because once circulation has effectively ceased 
due to the effect of progressive hypoxia on the heart, the dying 
or decaying process continues just the same regardless whether 
the nonbeating heart and nonfunctioning lungs remain 
physically in the circulationless body or not. (Shewmon, and 
Shewmon 2004, 110, emphasis added) 
 
Note that in these passages, Shewmon wrote as if ‘causing death’ and 
‘hastening death’ amount to roughly the same thing. However, we will see 
that, depending on how we conceive of causation, while the two notions 
can indeed be interchangeable if a specific but-for styled account of 
causation restricted to the causation of death is adopted, they can also mean 
radically different things according to other accounts, such as according to 
a version of NESS 22  which regards the death of A as some event 
incorporating all details of the way the death comes about. 
 
For simplicity of treatment, I shall define the vitality of an organ in terms 
of ‘causing death’ first, and then identify ‘causing death’ with ‘hastening 
death’ as Shewmon seems to have suggested, only after a particular notion 
of death causing is subscribed later. 
 
Recall that in this section we shall understand the ‘vital organ’ in DDR in 
the second sense. As a consequence, by Contraposition and some other 
elementary logical rules, DDR can be rephrased as  
 
[DDR2] If A is not already dead at t, then an organ H of a person 
A can be procured for donation at time t only when H is not 
vital then. 
                                                 
22 NESS is a short for Necessary Element in a Set of conditions Sufficient for the effect. 
See, for instance, Moore (2009) and references therein for how it works. 
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Now, defining vitality of an organ in terms of ‘causing death’, we have 
 
[Vitality] An organ H of A is vital at t if the procurement of H 
from A at t would cause A’s death, 
 
As the DDR is clearly a rule concerning the living rather than the dead, and 
for a dead person no organ is vital, the antecedent of [DDR2] can be 
dropped, and then [DDR2] and [Vitality] can be combined into a single 
rule. 
 
[*] An organ H of a person A can be procured for donation at 
time t only if the procurement of H would not cause A’s death. 
 
This is a decent rule. However, what exactly do we mean by ‘causing of a 
death’ here and what are the causal relata in question?23 While this paper 
is no place for us to review a full range of accounts of causation and give 
the causation in question a particular theory-laden interpretation, we can at 
least consider two standard accounts of causation, namely the 
counterfactual account of David Lewis and the NESS account of Richard 
W. Wright, and see whether they are up to the job of characterizing the 
causation in [*]. 
 
Recall that the counterfactual account of causation faces the challenge of 
pre-emption. Take the famous Suzy and Billy throwing rock scenario for 
example. Suzy and Billy both threw a rock at a bottle, Suzy’s rock hit the 
bottle first and broke it. Intuition seems to suggest that Suzy’s throwing 
the rock is the cause of the breakage of the bottle. Nonetheless, according 
to the counterfactual theory of causation, had Suzy not thrown the rock, 
the bottle would have been broken by Billy’s rock, so Suzy’s throwing of 
the rock is not the cause. This is counter-intuitive. 
 
The NESS account solves the problem by reckoning that while Suzy’ 
throwing a rock is not a but-for cause, it is indeed a necessary element of 
a set of conditions sufficient for the breakage of the bottle. So Suzy’s 
throwing is a NESS cause of the breakage. Nevertheless, according to this 
account Billy’s throwing a rock is a NESS cause as well. This is counter-
intuitive too. 
 
To solve the counter-intuitive conclusions mentioned above, the 
counterfactual theorist and NESS theorist often resort to the fact that by 
examining the way the bottle was broken to pieces one can establish that 
the underlying causation at work is Suzy’s rock breaking the bottle rather 
                                                 
23 See Hall and Paul (2004) and the references therein. 
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than Billy’s rock breaking the bottle. In other words, by fine-graining the 
effect, so that ‘the breakage of the bottle’ contains more details about how 
it is broken, both the but-for test and NESS test remain plausible accounts 
of causation. 
 
Hereafter, I will apply a time-frame analysis to (1) the rock-throwing case, 
(2) a famous hypothetical of McLaughlin and (3) the organ procurement 
case, which is the primary concern of this paper, and show that there is a 
better strategy dealing with the causation of death than indefinitely fine-
graining the effect. 
 
We start with an analysis of a but-for statement. In saying that but for the 
procurement of H, A would not have died, we surely do not mean that but 
for the procurement of H, A would live forever. Rather, we seem to have a 
time frame such that at some time t~>t, both the procurement of H and the 
death of A has happened, at t and t respectively, with t>t, and had the 
procurement of H not occurred, the death of A would occur at some other 
time t> t~. The problem here is that this reference time t~ seems 
arbitrary—being the time the discourse takes place. 
 




Figure 1. The Rock-Throwing Case 
 
 
We have the following candidates for a but-for account based on the 
location of t—the time of the breakage of the bottle had Suzy not thrown 
the rock. 
 
1) [But-for 1] t =   But for Suzy’s throw, the bottle would never 
be broken  
2) [But-for 2] t > t~  But for Suzy’s throw, the bottle would still be 
unbroken at the time of discourse. 
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3) [But-for 3] t > t  But for Suzy’s throw, the bottle would still be 
unbroken at t. 
4) [Fine-grained] The location of t is irrelevant, even t < t is 
acceptable. What matters is Suzy’s signature/seal in the 
breakage. 
  
Now, as the primary concern of this paper is not a general account of 
causation, we will be content with applying the above framework only to 
the causation of death. In that case, option 1) and 2) are to be ruled out 
right away as, first, even if the procurement had not been carried out, the 
death of patient would have been bound to happen at some later time, and, 
second, an organ donation case can be reviewed at any time and there is no 
apparent reason why the discourse time should play a role, despite that a 
but-for statement usually, on the face of it, takes the form of “… would not 
have happened”. 
 
Option 4) is more subtle and it seems to capture many, if not most, people’s 
intuition. As long as a high-speed camera captures the detail of the 
breakage of the bottle and reveals that it’s Suzy’s rock that is involved in 
the physical process of the breakage of the bottle, then some would think 
it’s Suzy’s rock throwing that caused the breakage, even if had Billy’s 
throwing not been pre-empted by Suzy’s throwing, Billy’s rock would 
have broken the bottle at a time t earlier than t. 
 
I would not try to challenge this intuition here, but would rather draw the 
reader’s attention to the following scenario adopted from a famous 
hypothetical of McLaughlin, which is discussed in McLaughlin (1925) and 
Moore (2009). A man, Dan say, was to travel to the desert with a bottle of 
water. Before he set off, one rival of his, Bob say, added poison to the 
water, intending to kill him, while an hour later, another rival of his, Sue 
say, without knowing what Bob had done, emptied the bottle, also 
intending to kill Dan. Dan died of thirst in the desert in the end. Now, what 
was the cause of his death? 
 
According to a coarse-grained but-for test, both rivals’ acts aren’t but-for 
causes for Dan’s death, while according to a coarse-grained NESS test, 
both rivals’ acts are NESS causes. Yet, according to a finer-grained but-
for test, Sue’s act is the cause of Dan’s death by thirst, because but for 
Sue’s act, Dan would not have died of thirst. On the other hand, according 
a finer-grained NESS test, Bob’s act isn’t the NESS cause of the death of 
Dan, because adding poison cannot be said to be a necessary element of a 
set of conditions sufficient for Dan’s death by thirst. The scenario can be 
summed up in the following way (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. The Water Keg Case 
 
 
Note that while, indeed, but for Sue’s act, Dan would not have died of 
thirst, and Sue’s act alone is a necessary element of a set of conditions 
sufficient for Dan’s dying of thirst, we can consider the following twist of 
the story before asserting that Sue’s act is the cause of Dan’s death. 
Suppose, that Sue was not a rival of Dan, and she knowingly emptied the 
bottle to avoid Dan’s being poisoned by Bob. Having no clean water to 
refill the bottle, Sue had done her best to save/prolong the life of Dan. It is 
simply ridiculous to say that her act is the cause of Dan’s death. 
 
Now, many theorists assume that actual causation is a factual causation24, 
but, if that is true, then the fact that we are reluctant to deem Sue’s act a 
cause of Dan’s death after learning the mindset of Sue together with the 
fact that the twist of the story does not affect the underlying physical facts 
represented in the picture should prompt us to have a second thought about 
embracing 4). 
 
Finally, back to our original context, I propose that, instead of embracing 
4), we adopt 3), and the procurement of H causes, or more 
straightforwardly hastens, the death of A only when t > t, as shown in 
Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. A Death-Hastening Procurement 
 
 
                                                 
24 See Moore (2009) for the repeated emphasis on this. 
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As a consequence of this account, if t < t, then even if the death of A does 
bear the signature of procurement, we cannot say that the procurement of 
H causes the death of A, after all, it prolongs life rather than hastens death. 
We then arrive at a new version of DDR, which can be term NHDR (No 
Hastening Death Rule) 
 
NHDR If a person A is to donate his/her organ H then the 
procurement of H should not hasten A’s death. 
 
Note that as vitality is understood as hastening death through procurement, 
NHDR amounts to the slogan: ‘No Vital Organ Procurement!’. This partly 
explains why people, such as Veatch, are tempted to suspect that DDR 
cannot be consistently held in the practices of vital-organ transplantation. 
However, as we have repeatedly stressed, vital-organs are not necessarily 
vital organs, and a vital-organ H can by all means be non-vital for A yet 
becomes a vital organ for B after the transplantation. There is no problem 
with the slogan. 
 
Before we look more closely at how the NHDR scheme works in the 
practice of organ procurements, we need to digress for a while to discuss 
an issue relevant to the re-formulation of DDR, so as to be better prepared 
for the analysis. Recall that we mentioned earlier that replacing 
‘irreversibility’ by ’permanence’ in the definition of death can shorten the 
waiting time for vital-organ procurements so that an organ can be procured 
well before it is damaged (Bernat 2013). However, this amounts to either 
changing UDDA or violating the DDR, because permanence does not 
imply irreversibility. After all, irreversibility is a modal property, which 
involves a set of possible worlds, but permanence only concerns the actual 
world. Irreversibility is a state of an entity which is characterized by its 
possible behaviors at various possible worlds, but permanence is not. To 
say that something has irreversibly lost some feature that it once exhibited, 
we need only to look at its current state and then, by consulting past 
statistics and predictions by experts, assert the irreversibility. But to say 
that the lost is permanent, we are talking about a four-dimensional 
continuum which constitutes the world line of the individual, therefore we 
can pass judgement without resorting to past statistics or future predictions 
about people in similar conditions. We simply need to check the whole 
continuum of an individual and find out whether the feature indeed never 
reappears. A patient whose heart has stopped but has not yet met the 
irreversibility criteria of UDDA—for example, the required several 
minutes’ waiting time has not yet elapsed—may actually be ‘permanently-
dead’ because no one attempted to resuscitate him. Therefore, permanence 
does not entail irreversibility. 
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On the other hand, it is imaginable that a patient who has been pronounced 
dead based on the irreversibility requirement of UDDA can be brought 
back to life by a miraculous divine action. Thus irreversibility25 does not 
entail permanence either. 
 
The advantage of the move to replace ‘irreversibility’ by ‘permanence’ in 
UDDA is of course that no doctor would be accused of procuring the heart 
from a heart stopping donor whose heart has not met the permanence 
requirement of death, because the doctor’s act of procurement itself would 
guarantee that no heart would ever be beating again in the chest of the 
donor. But this move is in practice unacceptable, because it will allow an 
ER staff who is reluctant to perform CPR to a heart stopping patient to 
defend himself/herself by saying that “the heart-beat monitor be my 
witness, at the time of the patient’s arrival, his heart has stopped 
permanently”. 
 
However, sticking to the irreversibility requirement of UDDA would, as 
Bernat (2013) stresses, allegedly increase the waiting time before 
procurement, because biological irreversibility generally comes much later 
than the irreversibility judged by current medical technology. Furthermore, 
modern medicine has made ECMO a standard equipment in major 
hospitals, thus theoretically a heart stopping patient cannot be declared 
dead before ECMO has been tried. But such waiting is in most cases 
unnecessary, a waste of resource, and even harmful to the patient and her 
family. What can we say about this? I think, as John Lizza has elaborated 
in Lizza (2005), irreversibility needs qualification. We have, to name just 
a few, logical irreversibility, metaphysical irreversibility, physical 
irreversibility, biological irreversibility, technological irreversibility, 
situational irreversibility (imagine you have a heart attack in the middle of 
the Sahara desert), and societal irreversibility (imagine you have signed a 
DNR26) etc. How is the irreversibility in UDDA to be understood? 
 
Biological irreversibility seems to be a nice candidate. However, taking 
into account the conjecture that life on earth starts as a result of a 
coincidental lightning strike to a suitable earth environment,27  there is 
always a chance that a dramatic event would bring a heart stopping patient 
back to life. Therefore, biological irreversibility is an unrealistic, even 
                                                 
25 People usually presuppose some practical constraints on reversibility. For example, if the 
story of Jesus’ raising Lazarus is true, we would still regard Lazarus’ state as dead before 
the raising, because under “normal” conditions a person in that state has no chance to be 
brought back to life. 
26 A shorthand for ‘Do Not Resuscitate’. 
27 For instance, see Hess, Piazolo, and Harvey (2021). 
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vacuous, notion to be considered as the underlying interpretation for 
irreversibility involved in the UDDA. In contrast, a notion of irreversibility 
based on a social-norm which takes biological, technological, situational, 
and legal considerations all into account can turn out to be more realistic. 
For a general account about how social norms can play a significant role 
in the ethics of killing, see Tsai (2017). 
 
Now, back to the main concern of this section. I claim that without taking 
the move to replace irreversibility by permanence, NHDR itself allows us 
to shorten the waiting time for the procurement of a heart that has stopped 
beating—especially when we have had the consent from a donor who very 
much liked to donate his or her heart, and we can make sure that the 
anesthesia will be properly administrated during the operation (so that 
autonomy and non-maleficence that Troug (2015), cares about will be 
safeguarded) without violating DDR. The details are as follows. 
 
2.2 Alternative Ways of Dying 
 
Recall that in contrast to hasty DCDD (the procurement of a stopping heart 
without waiting long enough to ensure irreversibility), treatment-
withdrawal with DNR has become an acceptable practice in many societies 
today. In other words, a dying patient can ask for the withdrawal of the life 
sustaining equipment and dying as a consequence, and no member of the 
medical staff would be accused of killing the patient by shutting down the 
life-sustaining system. On the other hand, the procurement of a heart that 
has stopped beating without waiting for several minutes to make sure that 
the heart of the donor has met the irreversibility criterion is disallowed as 
it violates [DDR1]. 
 
However, if NHDR is adopted instead, then a hasty DCDD does not always 
violate DDR. To decide whether such an act of procurement violates DDR, 
we are to see whether the act hastens death, by comparing the times of 
death associated with the procurement and the non-procurement (the 
default) respectively. In Figure 4, compare the following value-time 
diagrams of a case of treatment-withdraw with DNR and a case of hasty 
DCDD.  
 
Cheng-Chih Tsai: Acts that Kill and Acts that do Not 
 27 
 
Figure 4. Two Ways of Dying 
 
 
In case that autonomy and non-maleficence are both guaranteed, there is 
no reason why a) is allowed while b) is disallowed. Judged from the graphs, 
a) and b) are both processes from life to death. They are simply two ways 
of dying. And so far as death time is concerned, the procurement does not 
hasten death insofar as t  t, so it does not violate NHDR. After all, in 
the case of a hasty DCDD for a patient with DNR, while it is hasty in the 
sense that the donor is not dead yet, so long as t  t, it does not hasten 
death, and thus what has been procured is not a vital organ and NHDR has 
not been violated. 
 
If nowadays we can accept, unlike some decades ago, that removing a life 
support device does not always constitute an act of killing, we should 
accept that a hasty DCDD does not necessarily constitute an act of killing 
as well. When one has decided to be let die and does not mind which course 
her dying process will take, death by treatment-withdrawal with DNR and 
death by DCDD really make little difference. 
 
The analysis scheme above is new but its conclusion—namely, hasty 
DCDD is not always wrong—is by no means new, as it has long been 
observed in Shewmon (2004) and Shewmon and Shewmon (2004). 
Nevertheless, the analytic scheme of this paper indeed grants us an easy 
and a principle-based way to explain why certain seemingly unacceptable 
acts are actually acceptable, as the following imaginary scenario 
demonstrates. 
 
A criminal has jumped from the top of a 101-story building to 
seek death. He will be dead in a few seconds. Before he hits the 
ground, he is offered a final chance to payback to society. With 
his consent, a cushion will be provided to delay the death, and 
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a hi-tech ultra-fast snatcher can procure his heart from his chest 
a split second before he eventually hits the ground, and the 
heart can then be used to save someone’s life soon after. If he 
agrees to the proposal, do we commit homicide by procuring 
his heart right before he crashes? Is his heart really a vital organ 
then? Will DDR be violated? 
 
The answers to the last three questions are clearly, I suppose, all ‘no’ as 
suggested by Figure 5. 
 
 





Let me sum up what we have achieved in this paper, by reviewing some of 
the claims in Marquis (2010) which maintains that DCDD donors are not 
dead. There Marquis claims that DCDD proponents often ‘appeal to 
permanence’ or ‘appeal to a norm’ to show that DCDD donors are dead, 
but the two appeals both fail. In Section 1, I have stressed that 
irreversibility and permanence are different things, so we should not 
substitute permanence for irreversibility and appeal to permanence. 
Similarly, substituting norm for irreversibility and then appealing to norm 
won’t work either, as criteria in UDDA are clearly biological in nature. 
Therefore, we agree with Marquis that the two appeals he addresses in his 
paper indeed fail. However, that does not imply that DCDD donors are not 
dead. It only shows that proponents of DCDD often appeal to wrong items. 
In Section 1, I have, without appealing to either permanence or norm, 
shown that so long as UDDA are properly understood and obeyed, DCDD 
donors are dead already within the scheme. Furthermore, in Section 2, I 
have shown that so long as autonomy and non-maleficence principles are 
Cheng-Chih Tsai: Acts that Kill and Acts that do Not 
 29 
observed, some hasty DCDDs—i.e. procurements done before DCDD 
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